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It is such an honor and a pleasure to be here. Thank you so
much for the kind introduction. The conference will focus on the
future of the First Amendment. I was asked to begin by looking back
just a bit to talk about the First Amendment in the first four years of
the John Roberts Court. A week ago Monday, on October 5, 2009,
the Supreme Court began the fifth year with John Roberts as Chief
Justice. Actually, the term unofficially began on Wednesday,
September 9, when the Justices came back from their summer recess
early for arguments in the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,1 which will likely be the most important First
Amendment case so far by the Roberts Court, and one sure to be
discussed a lot here today.
I think in order to discuss the First Amendment and the Roberts
Court, we need to look more generally at the first few years of the
Roberts Court, and we need to situate the First Amendment cases in
this context. I want to make three quick overviews about the Roberts
Court, where it is, and then apply these to some specific themes about
the Roberts Court and the First Amendment. First, let me tell you a
little about the Court by the numbers. Last year the Supreme Court
decided 75 cases after briefing and oral arguments. It is a bit more
from the 67 cases the year before, and a bit more than the 68 cases the
year before that. To put this in a historical context, the Supreme
Court for much of the 20th century was deciding over 200 cases a
year. As recently as the 1980s, the Court was averaging about 160
cases a year. So in that sense, the 75, or 67 decisions of the last two
years are dramatic downsizing in the docket. This is important as we
look at the First Amendment. 2 There have not been that many First
t Founding dean and distinguished professor of law, University of California, Irvine
School of Law.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. See Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
WILLAMETTE LAWREVIEW
Amendment cases of the Roberts Court, and that is because there have
not been that many decisions by the Roberts Court. The smaller
docket has enormously important implications for the First
Amendment, and all areas of law. More of the major legal issues are
going a longer time before being resolved. More conflicts among the
states and the circuits are going a longer time before being settled.
Another less noticed implication of the smaller docket is that the
number of decisions has gone down, but the length of the opinions
has increased. I can show a perfect inverse correlation, as the number
of cases decided per year decreases, the average length of opinion, as
measured by words per page and number of pages, increases. Now I
am not sure what is the cause and what is the effect. Is the court
taking fewer cases because they want to write longer opinions? Or as
I would guess, are they writing longer opinions because they have
fewer cases? It is now common, especially in the high profile cases,
for there to be slip opinions that are greater than 150 pages long. One
of the things I have to do every July is edit annual supplements to my
Constitutional Law and Criminal Procedure casebooks. There is no
way to edit a 150-page opinion down to an assignment for law
students in one night without making a hash of it. So I am starting a
new campaign that I would ask you to join me in. Word and page
limits should be imposed on Supreme Court opinions.
There are some other statistics that might interest you. The two
Justices that were most often in agreement last term were Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. They voted together 92%
of the time. The two Justices next most often in agreement were
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia. You can guess who
the two Justices were who were next most often in agreement:
Justices Scalia and Alito. I think it is a clear indication of the
ideology of two of the newest members of the court, and that has
implications, as I will talk about in a moment, for the First
Amendment.
The second general observation: When it matters most, it is the
Anthony Kennedy Court. I know we refer to it as the Roberts Court
out of tradition and deference to the Chief Justice, but at least in the
perspectives of lawyers who stand before the Justices and write briefs
to the Court, this is the Anthony Kennedy Court. Last year, the
Justice who was most often in the majority was Anthony Kennedy:
7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington /07scotus.html.
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92% of the time. In each of the four years in which John Roberts has
been Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy has been in the majority in most
5-4 decisions. Last term, of 75 cases, 23 were decided 5-4. Justice
Anthony Kennedy was in the majority in 18 of 23, more than any
other Justice. The year before that, when there were 67 cases, 14
were decided 5-4, and Justice Kennedy was in the majority in 9, more
than any other Justice. In the year before that, when there were 68
cases, 24 were decided 5-4, and Justice Kennedy was in the majority
in every one of them. It is the only term I can identify with a
significant number of 5-4 decisions where one Justice was in the
majority every time. This holds true with regard to the First
Amendment as well, as I will show you in a moment. If for nothing
else, this is relevant for the lawyers who practice before the Court.
There is often a sense of arguing to an audience of one. I recently
wrote a brief in a case and I will tell you in all honesty, my brief was
a shameless attempt to pander to Justice Kennedy. If I could, I would
have put Justice Kennedy's picture on the cover of my brief. My brief
was not unique among those in this case. This case is not unique
among those on the docket. It is the Anthony Kennedy Court.
The third and final observation is that, generally, this is a very
conservative court. Now, there is a very easy explanation for this:
Anthony Kennedy sides with the more conservative block much more
often than he sides with the more liberal block. Statistics bear this
out. I mentioned that last term, of 75 cases, 23 were decided 5-4. In
16 of those 23 cases, the Justices split long traditional ideological
lines. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito were on one side.
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer were on the other. In
11 of the 16, Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives. In 5 of the
16, he sided with the more liberal Justices. That has been true all four
years where John Roberts has been Chief Justice. Anthony Kennedy
sides with the conservatives more than twice as often as with the more
liberal Justices. In fact, in each of the major First Amendment cases
that was decided 5-4, Anthony Kennedy has sided with the
conservatives, not the liberals.
So, having painted this general picture of the Roberts Court, let
me specifically get to the task to which I was assigned, and talk about
what the Roberts Court has done with regard to the First Amendment.
Here, I identify three themes. First, the Roberts Court has given great
deference to the government as government in First Amendment
2010]
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cases.3 It has been very statist. Let me give you a couple examples to
support this. The first, which I regard as one of the most important
Roberts Court's decisions regarding the First Amendment, is Garcetti
v. Ceballos.4 Richard Ceballos was an Assistant District Attorney in
Los Angeles County. He believed that a witness in one of his cases, a
deputy sheriff, was not telling the truth. He wrote a memo to that
affect. His supervisor told him to soften the memo, take out some of
the language, and some of the accusations. He refused, believing that
his doubts were accurate.5 In fact, he turned over a copy of his memo
to the defense, as he believed he was required to do under Brady v.
Maryland6 and its progeny. As a result, he alleged that he was
removed from his supervisory position and transferred to a less
desirable location. He said this was in retaliation for his speech, and
he sued for violation of the First Amendment. A motion to dismiss
was made for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit ruled that
there was a cause of action under the First Amendment.7 The
Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision. Justice Kennedy wrote for
the majority.8 I want to pause here. Many had noted previously that
Justice Kennedy had been one of the more speech protective Justices
under the Rehnquist Court. This has not continued to be true under
the Roberts Court. This case, I think, is typical of many that I will
discuss where Kennedy votes against the free speech position. Justice
Kennedy said, and this is the holding of Garcetti, that there is no First
Amendment protection for the speech of government employees,
while on the job, in the scope of their duties.9 Justice Kennedy
explained that a distinction must be drawn between a person as a
citizen as opposed to a person as a government employee.' 0 The First
Amendment provides protection for speech in the former capacity, but
not as to the latter." Justice Kennedy expressed great concern that
the federal judiciary might be turned into a super employment
agency.' 2  The worry was that anyone who was fired or suffered
3. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
4. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
5. Id. at 413-14.
6. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
7. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (2004).
8. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413.
9. Id. at 421.
10. Id. at418-19.
11. Id. at419-20.
12. Id. at 424.
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adverse employment consequences might allege that it was because of
speech and then bring a lawsuit in federal court. The holding, as
Justice Souter pointed out in the dissent, was broad. 13 There is no
First Amendment protection for the speech of government employees,
on the job, in the scope of their duties. I have read dozens of lower
court cases that have applied Garcetti and they have generally applied
it expansively against government employees.1 4  There is some
litigation about what it means to be in the scope of one's duties, but
generally courts have come down on the side of the government.' 5 I
find this decision very troubling. I find the premise that there is a
difference between speech as a citizen and speech as employee a
tough one to justify. A government employee does not give up his or
her citizenship when walking into the government office building. I
am troubled that the Court here decided to adopt such a bright line
rule covering all government employees in all contexts. I am most
worried here for what it will mean in terms of exposing wrongdoing
with the government.
About a decade ago, in the year 2000, I was asked to do a study
of the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") after the Rampart
scandal was exposed. As part of this, I interviewed 75-100 police
officers and learned that the greatest problem at the LAPD was a
culture that created a code of silence. There was tremendous pressure
against officers revealing the wrongdoing of other officers. I learned
a new phrase as I was doing my report: "freeway therapy." Officers
said that those officers who reported misconduct of other officers to
supervisors would be transferred to the precinct furthest from where
they live. Hence the phrase, "freeway therapy." In Los Angeles, that
can be a distance of two to three hours, in terms of the commute.
When the Christopher Commission did its report on LAPD after the
Rodney King beating, it said that the single largest obstacle to an
effective disciplinary system was the code of silence.' 6 How can we
encourage police officers to come forward and report wrongdoing to
their supervisors if there is no First Amendment protection for that?
13. Id. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010); Weintraub v.
Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 200-01 (2nd Cir. 2010).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693-94 (5th Cir. 2007);
Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1242-43 (1 1th Cir. 2007).




Justice Kennedy, for the majority in Garcetti, said that there is civil
service protection; whistle-blower protection.' 7  As the dissent
pointed out, often that is non-existent or inadequate.' 8 To this day,
there is no whistle-blower protection at the LAPD for officers to
come forward and report wrongdoing by other officers.
There is also an anomaly that this decision creates that I think
will create a long-term, even larger threat to free speech. Had
Ceballos gone to the Los Angeles Times or CBS radio, his speech
would have been protected by the First Amendment. However, since
he went in the department, it was not protected. The holding of
Garcetti v. Ceballos is that speech on the job in the scope of
employment is not protected.' 9 It does not change the law about
speech by government employees to external media. I do not think
that the Supreme Court wanted to encourage Ceballos to go to the Los
Angeles Times or CBS radio rather than his supervisors, and I worry
that this will create pressure to reduce the protection of speech of
government employees when they are talking to others.
Let me give you another example of this theme of the Court
being deferential to the government as government, and that is the rise
of the so-called "government speech doctrine.' 2 ° The government
speech doctrine is a relatively recent invention. We can argue about
when it started. One of the first major cases was Rust v. Sullivan2l in
1991. Rust v. Sullivan involved a federal law that said recipients of
federal funds could not advise, or give information, with regard to
abortion, in terms of counseling or referrals.22 The Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, upheld this as constitutional.23  Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court and said that this is the government as
speaker.24 The government was saying that if a Planned Parenthood
organization got federal money, they could not offer abortion services
or abortion counseling. But the Supreme Court said that since these
are government funds, we should think of this as the government
17. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
18. Id. at 439-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 421-22.
20. See Blake R. Bertagna, The Government's Ten Commandments: Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum and the Government Speech Doctrine, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 6 (2009); Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
21. 500U.S. 173 (1991).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300(a)(6).
23. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.
24. Id. at 193-94.
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speaking. 25 Although it was not literally the government as the
speaker, the Court saw it as similar enough to coin the phrase of
"government speech." There were other Rehnquist Court decisions
that adopted and used this "government speech" notion.26 There is a
case called National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley,27 which said
that recipients of Federal National Endowment of the Arts money
could not engage in indecent art. The Supreme Court upheld this as
constitutional, saying that since it is the government's money, in
essence, the government is the speaker, so the restrictions cannot
violate the First Amendment.28 Even though the term "indecent art"
is vague, the Court said the government was not acting as a regulator,
where vagueness is of concern; it is the government as a subsidizer of
the speaker.
29
In the last year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court decided a case
called Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association.30  A tax is
imposed on cattle producers, per head of cattle, that then goes into a
fund to pay for generic advertising to encourage people to consume
beef.3' Some cattle producers did not want to have to contribute to
the fund. They would rather use those funds for advertisements for
their specialized products, like organic beef. The producers said the
tax violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Scalia, upheld the tax as constitutional.32 Justice
Scalia expressly called this "government speech., 33  He said the
government wants to express a message to encourage people to eat
more beef.34 The government is allowed to express that message, and
the government can certainly use tax dollars to do this. 35 It does not
have to be a tax on the general population, it can be a tax on cattle
25. Id. at 195.
26. E.g., Nat'l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
27. 524 U.S. 569.
28. Id. at 587-88.
29. Id. at 586-87.
30. 544 U.S. 550.
31. Id. at 553-55; see also The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§
2901-2911 (2010).
32. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 566-67.
33. Id. at 562.
34. Id. at 560-61.




But, I think the most important, and the most insidious
government speech case, was a decision from last year in a case
called Pleasant Grove City v. Summum. 37 Pleasant Grove is a city in
Utah and it has a public park. In the public park, there is a Ten
Commandments monument. A group called "Friends of the Eagles"
donated the Ten Commandments monument to the city. The
monument was almost certainly paid for by Cecil B. De Mille. Cecil
B. De Mille made a movie in the 1950s called The Ten
Commandments,38 and he paid for the Friends of the Eagles to put up
hundreds, maybe thousands of these monuments, all over the country.
I got to argue a case in the Supreme Court in 2005 involving one of
these monuments; a case called Van Orden v. Perry.39 It involves a
six-foot high, three-foot wide, Ten Commandments monument that
sits directly at the corner of the Texas state capital and the Texas
Supreme Court. The question at oral argument that took me most by
surprise came from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. She said, "Wasn't
this monument paid for by Cecil B. De Mille?" And I answered
honestly, of course, and I said, "We don't know who paid for this
particular monument, but we do know that he paid for monuments all
over the country.'4°
The Summums are a small faith. They went to the city officials
of Pleasant Grove and said that since there was a monument of the
Ten Commandments in the park, they wanted to put up a monument
of their religion, specifically a monument of the seven aphorisms of
their faith. 41 The city refused and the Summums sued. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the
Summum religious organization.42 The Tenth Circuit said that this
was impermissible content-based discrimination with regard to
speech.43 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed in an opinion by
Justice Samuel Alito.44 Justice Alito said this is government speech.45
36. Id. at 562-63.
37. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
38. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (Paramount Pictures 1956).
39. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
40. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
41. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1127.
42. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct.
1125 (2009).
43. Id. at 1047.
44. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
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Justice Alito went on to say that frequently government chooses to
speak, with things like monuments and that when the government
engages in speech, it can make content-based choices, even viewpoint
based discriminations.46 The government can choose to express one
message, and not another.47 Put that way, it does not sound so
troubling. But now think of the following hypothetical. Imagine there
is a city with a public park and the city officials decide to allow a pro-
war demonstration in the park. Some anti-war demonstrators come
and say "we want to use the same park, in the same way, for our anti-
war demonstration," and the city refuses to allow it. The answer
should be easy: that violates the First Amendment. That is the kind of
viewpoint discrimination that goes against the very core of what free
speech is about. But imagine that the city officials say, "we adopt the
private, pro-war demonstration, as our government speech, just like
Pleasant Grove adopted the privately donated Ten Commandments
monument as its government speech." Pleasant Grove never made an
official adoption as government speech; the Court implied that. Here,
maybe the city makes an official adoption. I cannot easily distinguish
my hypothetical from the Court's holding in Pleasant Grove. Justice
Alito drew a distinction in his opinion between the monument being
permanent speech, and my hypothetical being transitory speech.48
But I do not understand why that matters in terms of the First
Amendment, and then you get into line drawing. If it is there for a
couple of days, does that then make it more permanent speech, and so
on?
The question should be, "Is this really the government as
speaker, or is the government creating a forum for expression?" To
be sure, the government can be the speaker. It can create government
playhouses, concert halls, and museums, where they can make
content-based choices. And if that is really what this is about, then I
think you can see where Justice Alito's opinion makes sense. On the
other hand, if this is the government creating a forum for speech, then
the government cannot engage in content discrimination. Parks are
the quintessential public forum. I think what the Court needed to
explain is, "why should this be regarded as the government as the
speaker, rather than the government, by creating a park, creating a
45. Id. at 1134.
46. Id. at 1131.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1132.
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forum?" That is the issue that is not discussed. Justice Stevens, in an
opinion concurring in the judgment, expressed great concern about
the "recently minted government speech doctrine."4 9  I share that
concern.
The second major theme that I would identify with regard to the
Roberts Court and the First Amendment is the triumph of
conservative values in First Amendment cases. Here I want to give
three examples where I think you will see that traditional conservative
values have won, and won because Justice Kennedy has sided with
the conservatives. The first of these examples is a case from a couple
years ago: Morse v. Frederick.50 The Olympic torch was coming
through Juneau, Alaska. A school decided to release its students to
stand on the sidewalk and watch the torch come through. A student
got together with some classmates, and some friends who were not at
the school, and unfurled a banner that said, and I'm quoting, "Bong
Hits 4 Jesus., 51 Here, I agree with something that Justice Souter said
at oral argument: "I have no idea what that means. 52
But the school principal thought that it was a message to
encourage illegal drug use. The banner was confiscated, and the
student was suspended from school. The student sued under the First
Amendment. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the student, and
against the school officials, who had claimed qualified immunity. 3
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed.54 Fitting with the
themes I identified at the beginning, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the
opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito.55 The Chief Justice said the principal could reasonably
interpret the speech as encouraging illegal drug use.56 Chief Justice
Roberts said schools have an important interest in stopping illegal
drug use, so they can punish the speech.57 Justices Kennedy and Alito
wrote a concurring opinion in which they said this is a narrow case,
really about the important interest of the school in stopping illegal
49. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
50. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
51. Id. at 397.
52. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49-50, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
53. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1125 (2006).
54. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410.
55. Id. at 395.
56. Id. at 401-02.
57. Id. at 408-09.
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drugs. 8 But I do not see it as a case that can be so easily cabined. I
think it is a major restriction in terms of student speech, a significant
expansion in the ability of schools to punish student speech. As you
know, the leading Supreme Court case about student speech was
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,59 now
forty years ago. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, spoke
eloquently, that students do not leave their First Amendment rights at
the schoolhouse gate.60 The Supreme Court said schools can punish
students only if their speech is actually disruptive of school
activities. 6' There was no claim by the school in Tinker that the
armband was even slightly disruptive of school activities, that
anybody paid any attention to it other than the principal. Moreover, it
seems that what the Court was concerned about was that this might
encourage illegal activity. But there are tests under the First
Amendment for incitement. 62  I think Justice Stevens made an
important point in his dissent in Morse when he said there is not a
shred of evidence that any student at the school was more likely to
use illegal drugs because of the banner that was held up. 63 Hard to
believe that any student, the smartest or the slowest, would be more
likely to go out and use drugs because they saw the banner that was
there. To me, it is about the deference to the government in the area
where conservatives always wanted great deference to the
government: wanting schools to fight drugs.
Let me give a second example with regard to the triumph of
conservative values. Now admittedly, it was not a case that was
decided on First Amendment grounds, but the First Amendment was
clearly in the background. It is a case from this year: Federal
Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations.64 You might
remember in 1978, in Federal Communications Commission v.
Pacifica,65 the Supreme Court said that a radio station could be
punished for broadcasting the George Carlin monologue on the seven
58. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
60. Id. at 506.
61. Id. at 508-09.
62. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 431
U.S. 494 (1951).
63. Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
65. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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dirty words.66 For the students in the audience, whenever I teach this,
I always tell them they do not have to memorize the list of the seven
dirty words for the exam, but I warn them when they see my exam
questions that they may be the first words that come to mind anyway.
In a footnote, the Court said that they were not dealing with the single
fleeting use of an expletive,67 and from 1978 until 2004, the FCC took
the position that the single, fleeting use of profanity, would not be
punishable. Then, in 2004, the conservative Bush FCC changed its
policy. There were a few incidents that they pointed to as the basis
for this. One involved Bono, at a music awards show, accepting his
award and saying it was brilliant, and using the "F" word as an
adjective before it.68 Another involved Cher, speaking to her critics,
and saying "go F them.",69 Another involved Nicole Richie, who
managed to use the "F" word and the "S" word in a single sentence.7 °
One other incident involved an episode of NYPD Blue, where the
word "bullshit" was used. The FCC said all of this could be punished.
The FCC said, "Any use of the 'F' word is deemed to be inherently
sexual." I have to admit, I do not think that when Cher said to her
critics, "go fuck them" she was proposing sexual relations with them.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that
the new FCC policy violated the Administrative Procedures Act, that
it was "arbitrary and capricious," that the FCC failed to justify the
basis for revising the policy.7' The Second Circuit said the First
Amendment issue was not posed, but it believed that the policy would
violate the First Amendment. 72  The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, reversed the Second Circuit.73 Justice Scalia wrote for the
Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito.74 Justice Scalia's decision focused
entirely on the Administrative Procedures Act, saying that the
decision of the FCC was not "arbitrary and capricious. 75 The Court
66. Id. at 751.
67. Id. at 729 n.1.
68. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1807-08.
69. Id. at 1809.
70. Id.
71. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455 (2nd Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129
S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
72. Id. at 462.
73. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
74. Id. at 1805.
75. Id. at 1814.
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said that it was not dealing with the First Amendment issue.
However, Justice Scalia said that the FCC could assume that any
exposure to profanities is inherently harmful to children.76 That goes
right to the First Amendment question, even though the Court did not
decide the First Amendment issue. I am the parent of four children,
and my sense is kids hear those words from early on, and I am not
persuaded that hearing those words really causes any damage to
children. I certainly do not use those words in everyday conversation.
I encourage my children not to, but I do not see what the real harm is
of hearing Bono, Cher, or Nicole Richie use those kinds of words. I
think the Second Circuit's point here was that the FCC failed to
justify this. I think that Justice Scalia's opinion is an indication that at
least some, if not a majority of the court, would side with the FCC
and its views, and will likely vote that way when the First
Amendment issue comes up. I think its telling here that Justice
Kennedy, who for so long had been thought of as a speech protective
Justice, sides with the more conservative Justices in upholding the
FCC policy. I would point you to a concurring opinion by Justice
Thomas that might have long-term significance that might be
discussed later today. Justice Thomas said that the "medium by
medium" approach that the Supreme Court had used for the First
Amendment makes no sense.77 He said over time, the Supreme Court
has developed certain rules for newspapers, which are different from
over-the-air television and radio, which is different from cable
television, which is then different from the telephone, which is
different from the Internet. He said now, many people receive all of
this media from one service provider. The "case by case" approach,
the "medium by medium" approach, does not make sense any
longer.78 I think he is clearly right here, and I hope that is a direction
for the future.
One more example that I would point to as the triumph of
conservative values on the Supreme Court is campaign finance. The
conservatives of the Supreme Court have consistently taken the
position that spending money in election campaigns is core political
speech and that any restriction has to meet strict scrutiny. Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have repeatedly taken the position that
76. Id. at 18.




any limit on campaign contributions, other than disclosure
requirements, violates the First Amendment. They have taken the
position that corporations have Free Speech rights, just like
individuals, and limits on corporate contributions to candidates
violate the First Amendment. We have already had a couple of
campaign contribution cases before the Roberts Court. In Randall v.
Sorrell, 79 the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont campaign
contribution limit. That was a 6-3 decision, with Justice Breyer
joining the five more conservative Justices, saying that if the
contribution limit is too low, it violates Freedom of Speech.80 There
was Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 8" which
involved a provision of the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act. It is a provision that says that corporations and
unions cannot take out broadcast advertisements for or against an
identifiable candidate, thirty days before a primary election or sixty
days before a general election.82 The Supreme Court upheld that as
facially constitutional in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission83 in 2003. To understand this area of law, it is important
to note that McConnell was a 5-4 decision. Justices Stevens and
O'Connor wrote a joint opinion for the majority, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer. 84 In Federal Election Commission v.
85Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court declared this provision
unconstitutional as applied to a political action corporation. It was a
5-4 decision with the five conservatives in the majority.
86
But the most important campaign finance case is the one that is
before the Court right now-the one I mentioned in my
introduction-Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.87 In
1907, Congress passed a law prohibiting corporations from
contributing money to candidates for federal elective office.88 This
79. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
80. Id. at 232.
81. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
82. Id. at 455-56; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006)).
83. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
84. Id. at 113.
85. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 457.
86. Id. at 454.
87. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
88. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
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was expanded to unions in the 1940s.8 9 Corporations have clever
lawyers, and they found a way around this. The corporations simply
took out the advertisements themselves, endorsing or opposing
candidates; they did not need to give the money to the candidate. In
1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Act to prohibit
corporations and unions from doing this.90 But, corporations and
unions, with clever lawyers, came up with a way to circumvent this.
The corporations and unions would simply take out so-called "issue
ads." The advertisements would never say "vote for or against" a
specific candidate, but they would criticize a candidate's position on a
particular issue, or praise a candidate's view on a particular issue, and
it was in the midst of the election campaign. It was not hard for the
listener to connect the dots. That was actually the underlying facts of
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission.9' An anti-
abortion political action corporation took out ads criticizing
Wisconsin Senator Russell Feingold for filibustering President Bush's
judicial nominations. This ad was run at the time that Russell
Feingold was standing for re-election. Congress tried to prevent this
through this provision of the McCain-Feingold law. The Supreme
Court upheld this provision just seven years ago in McConnell v.
Federal Elections Commission.
92
Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission involves a
conservative Political Action Corporation that made a movie very
critical of Hillary Clinton. 93 The question is whether the provision in
McCain-Feingold that I described applies to this movie. That issue
was briefed and argued to the Supreme Court last term. 94  To
everyone's surprise, on June 29, rather than deciding it, the Supreme
Court asked for new briefing and argument on the issue of whether
prior Supreme Court decisions allowing restrictions of corporate
expenditures violate the First Amendment.
95
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,96 in 1990, and in
89. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136;
War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act of 1943, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163.
90. Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88
Stat. 1272 (1974).
91. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 459.
92. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
93. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
94. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009).
95. Id.
96. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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McConnell, the Supreme Court said the government can restrict
corporate spending with regard to elections campaigns. 97 I have now
had the chance to read the transcript of the oral argument in Citizens
United and I think it is pretty clear, and the conventional wisdom
seems to be that it is going to be a 5-4 decision holding that
corporations have the right to spend unlimited amounts of money with
regard to election campaigns. I do not think it will be in this case, but
I think soon there will be a 5-4 decision to hold that corporations
have the right to contribute money to candidates for elective office,
and I think it will only be a short time before it will be 5-4 to hold
that all contribution limits, other than disclosure requirements, violate
the First Amendment. And again, it will be the five most
conservative Justices. Now, there is an irony here. You will notice
that the only place where the conservatives on the Court have taken a
pro-speech position is with regard to corporate political spending.
There are many other ironies. Conservatives often embrace
originalism, following the original meaning of the Constitution. I
challenge any originalist to show how corporations have Free Speech
rights under the First Amendment. The framers, if anything, believed
in natural rights as a basis for individual liberties. Corporations do not
have such natural rights. Also, conservatives long railed against
judicial activism. Notice the activism. Laws adopted by Congress
and signed by the President are struck down, and long-standing
precedents are being overruled. But most of all, I am very troubled
by this in terms of what it is going to mean in terms of election
campaigns-local, state, and federal-as corporations can spend
unlimited amounts of money to get their candidates of choice elected,
and candidates they oppose defeated.
The third and final overall theme that I identify with regard to
the First Amendment is the triumph of "majoritarianism" with regard
to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. This wonderful
conference is focusing on both speech and religion, and I think that
what we have seen, and will see from the Roberts Court is what I
would call "the triumph of majoritarianism," leaving the protection of
religious freedom, leaving the enforceable walls separating church
and state, entirely to what the government does. It is the complete
absence of any protection of minority religions or minority
viewpoints with regard to religion. I think we already saw this
97. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-61; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24.
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happen with regard to the Free Exercise Clause almost twenty years
ago when the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v.
Smith.98 In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court said
that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be used to challenge "neutral
laws of general applicability." 99 Put into English, so long as the law
was not motivated by a desire to interfere with religion, so long as it
applies to everyone, there cannot be an exemption for religion, no
matter how much the law burdens religion. You may remember it as
the "Native American Peyote case." Oregon law prohibited
consumption of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance.100  Native
Americans brought a challenge saying that religious rituals required
the use of peyote. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, ruled against the Native Americans.' 0' The Court said that
Oregon law was not motivated by a desire to interfere with religion; it
applied to everyone, so there is no exemption. 10 2 In other words, if
religions want exemptions from law, they must turn to the legislative
process, not the courts, no matter how much the law burdens religion.
Minority religions must rely entirely on the majority for their
protections. Congress has responded with a couple of statutes.'0 3 The
only Roberts Court decisions about Free Exercise of Religion have
been about these statutes, and in both instances the Supreme Court
has followed the majoritarianism paradigm, upholding and allowing
these statutes to be used.
One of these statutes is the Religious Freedom and Restoration
Act ("RFRA") adopted in 1993.1°4 It was meant to overrule
Employment Division v. Smith, trying to restore religious freedom by
statute, to what it had previously been under the Constitution. The
RFRA says that if the government significantly burdens religion, the
government must meet strict scrutiny, showing that its action is
necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.105  The
Supreme Court declared this unconstitutional as applied to state and
98. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
99. Id. at 879.
100. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1997).
101. Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 890.
102. Id.
103. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006);
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
105. Id.
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local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores'0 6 in 1997. The Court
said that the law exceeded the scope of congressional power under
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. 10 7 The Supreme Court has never
expressly ruled as to whether or not the statute remains constitutional
as applied to the federal government, but the Supreme Court did use
this statute in one of the first Roberts Court decisions about religion.
The case was Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
Vegetal.108 It involves a small religion that uses an herb from Central
America in a tea that is hallucinogenic. The federal government
wanted to stop them from using this substance as banned under
federal law. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the
religion and against the federal government. 0 9 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote for the Court. It is key to note that the decision was not based
in any way on free exercise of religion under the First Amendment; it
was based on using the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to show
that the government failed to show a compelling need to keep a small
religion from using this herb-this tea-that comes from Central
America.
The other statute that Congress adopted was the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 1° This was adopted after
RFRA was declared unconstitutional as applied to state and local
governments."' Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, as you may know, is often referred to with the acronym
RLUIPA. RLUIPA says that if the government significantly burdens
religious freedom in its land use decisions, with regard to
institutionalized persons, it must meet strict scrutiny." 2 A challenge
was brought, arguing the RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause
because the government was acting with the purpose of advancing
religion. The Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson "3 -the opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg-said the RLUIPA does not violate the
Establishment Clause. This is consistent with the majoritarianism
paradigm. The Court is not going to protect Free Exercise under the
106. 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
107. Id.
108. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
109. Id. at 439.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
111. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
113. 544 U.S. 709, 725-26 (2005).
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First Amendment; it is going to leave that to the majority. And if the
majority wants to protect religious freedom through legislation, it can
do so.
I think we will soon see the triumph of majoritarianism when it
comes to the Establishment Clause. There is a case before the Court
that was argued on October 7, that may be the vehicle for this. The
case is Salazar v. Buono,1 14 and it involves a large cross that sits on
what was previously federal land in the Mojave Desert. A challenge
was brought arguing that the cross sitting by itself violates the
Establishment Clause. The district court found it violated the
Establishment Clause;'" 5 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed. 16 The Ninth Circuit held that a cross is uniquely a religious
symbol of Christian faith.' 1 7  The Court said that a reasonable
observer would see a cross by itself on federal land as endorsing
religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause." 8  The federal
government then transferred ownership of the land where the cross
is-a very small parcel-to a Veterans of Foreign Wars group, to try
to circumvent the holding of the district court and the Ninth Circuit.
The district court and the Ninth Circuit said that this was a sham
transfer. 119 The transfer of ownership was done entirely by the
government to try to circumvent the Establishment Clause. The
National Parks service still manages this land. The reasonable
observer would see this in the context of a federal park as symbolic
endorsement of religion. Besides, there would be no stopping point if
the government could avoid the Establishment Clause this way. A
city could put a large Latin cross atop city hall, and then say, "Well,
we will transfer ownership of part of the rooftop to a private group,
and therefore we do not need to worry about the Establishment
Clause." There is an issue in this case presented as to who has
standing to challenge religious symbols.
During the years when William Rehnquist was Chief Justice,
there were four Justices who urged a major change with regard to the
114. 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
115. Buono v. Norton (Buono 1), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
116. Buono v. Norton (Buono I1), 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 549-50
118. Id.
119. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal 2005), affd
sub nom, Buono v. Kempthome (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (2007), amended by 527
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
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Establishment Clause. When the Supreme Court first applied the
Establishment Clause to the states in 1947, in Everson v. Board of
Education,120 all nine Justices said that the Establishment Clause can
be understood by a phrase coined by Thomas Jefferson, as creating a
wall separating church and state "high and impregnable."'' 1 But,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
vehemently reject the idea that there should be a wall that separates
church and state. They take a philosophy that is sometimes called
"accommodationism." They believe that we should be able to
accommodate religion and government, and government and religion.
Their view is that the government only violates the Establishment
Clause if it literally establishes a church or coerces religious
participation or when its aid favors one religion over another. In their
view, religious symbols on government property never violate the
Establishment Clause. When I argued Van Orden v. Perry22 in the
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy said to me at oral argument, with
some anger in his voice, "If your client doesn't like the Ten
Commandments monument, why doesn't he just look the other
way?"'2 3 Of course, there is no stopping point to that. Then a city
could put the Latin cross on top of city hall and simply say, "If you
don't like it, just look the other way." Besides that, it equates the
Establishment Clause as being no more than about protecting people
from being offended by religious symbols. The Fourth Amendment is
not just about protecting people from their privacy being invaded;
Free Speech is not just about protecting people from having their
expression limited. The Establishment Clauses creates a personal
right for individuals, that the government not endorse religion, that
the government not establish religion.
But I think there are now five Justices on the Court to take the
accommodamist position: Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito. This is an approach that is highly majoritarian. It says the
government can do what it wants with regards to endorsing and
furthering religion. Justice Scalia has often taken this position,
joined by the other conservative Justices. You might remember the
important Establishment Clause case: Lee v. Weisman'2 4 from 1992.
120. 330 U.S. 1(1947).
121. Everson, 330 U.S.. at 18.
122. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
123. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
124. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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It involved whether a clergy-delivered prayer at a public school
graduation violates the Establishment Clause. 25 The Supreme Court
declared this unconstitutional, 5-4.126 Justice Scalia wrote a
vehement dissent. 127 He concluded by saying "We hear a lot about
the minority that does not want prayer at graduation. What about the
majority that wants the prayer there?' 128  Or, in the recent Ten
Commandment case, McCreary County v. ACLU,129 Justice Scalia
talked about how 97% of people are from Judeo-Christian
religions, 130 very likely not an accurate statistic, and that the
government should be able to advance their religious views. 13 1 But
what about the rights of the minority? If you believe that the
Constitution, the First Amendment, the religious clauses are
protecting the minority, then that is going to be absent. I think that
majoritarianism will mean that the Supreme Court will hold that the
government can put any symbols it wants on government property. I
think the Supreme Court will say the government can give any aid it
wants to parochial schools, even if religious indoctrination, so long as
the government does not discriminate amongst religions. I think it
will really be the triumph of majoritarianism. And if you think about
it, in the context of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
they will largely be read out of the First Amendment. Rare will be
the case when the government will be found to violate the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.
So let me conclude then, by focusing on what the Obama
presidency and the confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor is likely
to mean for the future of the Supreme Court and the future of the First
Amendment. My conclusion is that the Obama presidency and the
Sotomayor Justiceship, are unlikely to change the overall ideological
composition of the Supreme Court, at least in the short term, and they
125. Id. at 580.
126. Id. at 631.
127. Id. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 645-46.
129. 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005).
130. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The three most popular
religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-which combined account for
97.7% of all believers-are monotheistic.").
131. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is nothing
unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer




are unlikely to make much difference with regard to the First
Amendment areas that I have discussed here this morning. Now why
do I say that? Well, think about where the vacancies are likely to
come on the Supreme Court from January 20, 2009, to January 20,
2013, and if you imagine a second Obama term, January 20, 2017.
David Souter retired last spring at the relatively young age for a
Justice of 69 years. 132 Justice John Paul Stevens turned 89 years old
on April 20, 2009.133 He is still in great health, as vibrant as ever, but
it does not seem that likely that he will still be on the Supreme Court
at age 93 in 2013, let alone age 97 in 2017. In fact, the media has
reported that he has hired only one law clerk for next year, fueling
speculation that he is preparing to step down. 134 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg turned 76 years old in February of 2009, the same month
that she was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. 135  The media,
thankfully, reported that it was caught in the earliest state. But
maybe, because she is so frail in appearance, there is always
speculation that she might step down. Now think of the other side of
the ideological aisle.
Chief Justice John Roberts turned 54 in January of 2009.136 If he
remains on the Supreme Court until he is 89 years old, he will be
Chief Justice until 2044. Justice Samuel Alito turned 59 on April 1 of
2009.137 Even though Clarence Thomas has been on the Supreme
Court almost 18 years, he just turned 61 years old. 138 Both Justice
Scalia and Kennedy turned 73 recently, 139 and I think the best
predicator of a long life span has been being confirmed for a seat on
the U.S. Supreme Court. So, absent unforeseen circumstances, it
does not seem likely that any of these Justices will be going anywhere
the next four years, the next eight years or the next decade. The
132. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited June 12, 2010).
133. Id.
134. Robert Barnes, Justice Stevens Hires Just One Clerk for 2010 Term,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR2009090203857.htm.
135. Carrie Johnson and Rob Stein, Ginsburg Undergoes Surgery for Cancer,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020501695.html?sid=ST2009020501946.
136. See Biographies of Current Justices of the . Supreme Court,
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vacancies for President Obama to fill are Justice Souter, and perhaps
Justice Stevens and/or Justice Ginsburg. My sense is President
Obama is likely to fill these vacancies with individuals of about the
same ideology. I would characterize Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, as moderate liberals. All, to be sure, are left of center.
None, I think, are as liberal, as Justice William Douglas, Justice
William Brennan, or Justice Thurgood Marshall.
This summer I read dozens, maybe hundreds, of Justice
Sotomayor's opinions for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. I would characterize her this way. I think on most
controversial issues, most issues defined by ideology, she will vote
the same way as Justice David Souter. I think that is probably true
with regard to the First Amendment, civil rights, and civil liberties
generally. I think with regard to criminal justice issues, she is more
likely to be conservative, more pro-law enforcement than Justice
Souter, as evident in her Second Circuit opinions, and probably a
reflection of her time as a state court prosecutor. Now, I do not lessen
the possibility that Justice Sotomayor may have real impact behind
closed doors. The Supreme Court is a small group, and there is the
opportunity for the Justices to persuade one another. Perhaps Sonia
Sotomayor, by virtue of her life experiences, her persuasiveness, her
considerable charm, might be able to persuade Justice Kennedy in
instances when Justice Souter could not.
But my bottom line, as I look at the Supreme Court in the term
ahead and for years to come, in the First Amendment and other areas,
is that if you are politically conservative, this is generally a Court you
should rejoice over. As the statistics I presented at the beginning
indicated, Justice Kennedy sides with the conservatives twice as often
as he sides with the liberals. And if you are politically liberal, maybe
you should be glad the Court is only deciding 75 cases a year.
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